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Este artigo responde a um influente desafio por parte do contextualismo à visão tradicional da relação entre significado e verdade. De acordo com este desafio, significados falham em determinar as condições de verdade por razões diferentes das formas usuais de influência contextual, que têm a ver com questões assim chamadas ‘pré-semânticas’ e com indexicalidade. Como resposta aos contextualistas, eu argumento que os exemplos apresentados pelos mesmos são naturalmente analisáveis do ponto de vista tradicional, e que as formas de dependência contextual que eles enfatizam não são, de forma alguma, novas ou problemáticas.
Abstract:
This essay responds to an influential contextualist challenge against the traditional view of the relationships between meaning and truth. According to that challenge, meaning fails to determine truth conditions for reasons unrelated to the customary forms of contextual influence, having to do with so-called ‘pre-semantic’ issues and with indexicality. As a response to the contextualist, I argue that the examples they present are naturally analyzable from the traditional viewpoint, and that the forms of contextual dependence they highlight are by no means novel or problematic.
Keywords: Minimalism. Contextualism. Meaning. Truth. Context-Sensitivity
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