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Este artigo examina o papel das intenções do falante no que diz respeito à determinação da referência para expressões, concentrando-se nos demonstrativos. Intuitivamente, o referente de um proferimento-token de ‘aquilo’ é fixado (pelo menos em parte) pelas intenções do falante. Se isto é correto, no entanto, temos um problema potencial para as chamadas teorias formais do significado. Eu começarei fixando a natureza deste problema e, em seguida, explorarei três supostas soluções. Primeiro, a assunção de que a intenção do falante fixa a referência nestes casos pode ser rejeitada; segundo, pode ser sustentada a tese de que as intenções correntes do falante são relevantes, mas podem ser acomodadas em uma teoria semântica formal; terceiro, a determinação da referência e o conteúdo semântico podem ser mantidos estritamente separados. Eu rejeito as duas primeiras possibilidades acima, chamadas respectivamente de ‘convencionalismo’ e ‘não-inferencialismo’, mas argumento que a terceira provê uma forma atraente para o semanticista formal de acomodar o conteúdo de expressões sensíveis ao contexto.
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of speaker intentions in issues of reference determination for context-sensitive expressions, focusing on demonstratives. Intuitively, the referent of a token utterance of ‘that’ is fixed (at least in part) by the speaker’s intentions. However, if this is right it causes a potential problem for so-called formal theories of meaning. I begin by setting out the nature of this problem and proceed to explore three putative solutions. First, the assumption that speaker intentions fix reference in these cases may be rejected; second, it may be held that current speaker intentions are relevant but that they can be accommodated within a formal semantic theory; third, reference determination and semantic content may be held strictly apart. I reject the first two of these moves, termed respectively ‘conventionalism’ and ‘non-inferentialism’, but argue that the third move provides an appealing way for the formal semanticist to accommodate the content of context-sensitive expressions.
Keywords: Speaker’s Intention. Reference. Context. Demonstratives. Meaning.
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