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Stephen Mumford (2004) propone una alternativa al Realismo Nomológico que no requiere resignar los compromisos modales comúnmente asociados a posiciones realistas, un Realismo Sin Leyes (RSL) donde el peso de la modalidad no está puesto sobre las leyes sino sobre propiedades entendidas en términos de poderes y disposiciones. Las ventajas relativas del RSL dependen, sin embargo, de una serie de objeciones que presenta al RN. La principal de ellas es la que Mumford denomina el Dilema Central, según el cual el RN no es capaz de dar cuenta de cómo las leyes gobiernas sus instancias. En el presente trabajo me propongo mostrar que ni el Dilema Central ni el resto de los argumentos de Mumford contra el RN justifican su rechazo.
Abstract:
Stephen Mumford (2004) proposes an alternative to Nomological Realism (NR) compatible with the modal commitments commonly associated to realist positions, a Realist Lawlessness (RL) in which the weight of modality is not set on laws but on properties, understood in terms of powers and propensities. However, RL’s relative merits depend on a series of objections presented to NR. The main one is the so-called Central Dilemma, according to which NR is unable to give an account of how laws govern their instances. In this paper, I aim to show that neither the Central Dilemma nor the rest of Mumford's arguments against NR justify its rejection.
Keywords: Natural laws. Scientific laws. Nomological Realism
Citas
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