Resumen
In §§1-2 I consider some issues that Guillermo raises in connection with Husserl, especially the distinction between the notion of state of affairs and the more general notion of situation of affairs conceived as a common substratum for different states of affairs. After a few remarks about Church’s slingshot argument in §3, I discuss several objections that Guillermo raises to my interpretation of Frege (§4), to Kripke’s notion of rigid designator (§5) and to my objections to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth (§6).Citas
HILL, C.O., ROSADO HADDOCK, G. Husserl or Frege? Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 2000.
HUSSERL, E. Experience and Judgment. Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. (Original edition,
)
KRIPKE, S. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1980.
ROSADO HADDOCK, G. “On Husserl’s Distinction Between State of Affairs (Sachverhalt) and Situation of Affairs (Sachlage)” (1991). In Hill and Rosado Haddock (2000), pp. 253-62.
VAN HEIJENOORT, J. (ed.) From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Descargas
Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.