Palabras clave
Cómo citar
Resumen
Constitutivists attempt to ground reasons for action in the constitutive features of agency. Central to Enoch's famous “shmagency” objection to constitutivism is the idea that constitutivists should worry about the question whether there is reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”—where a shmagent is a non-agent being who lacks the constitutive features of agency, but is otherwise as similar to agents as can be. I explain why constitutivism isn’t in trouble even if there’s no reason to be an agent. The nature of agency can in principle ground authoritative reasons for agents to act, even if there isn’t, in addition, a reason to be an agent. Relatedly, I explain why a prominent strand in previous responses to Enoch is misleading in focusing on whether the request for reasons to be an agent, as posed by the shmagent, is even possible or intelligible. Even if the shmagent’s request for reasons is possible and intelligible—as I argue it is—this doesn’t matter for constitutivists, for the request is misguided: constitutivists need no reasons to be an agent.Citas
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics. Transl. Christopher Rowe, with Philosophical Introduction and Commentary by Sarah Broadie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
BUKOSKI, M. A Critique of Smith’s Constitutivism. Ethics 127(1):116-146, 2016.
DARWALL, S. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
DREIER, J. 1997. Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality. In Ethics and Practical Reason, eds. Cullity & Gaut. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Reprinted with some modifications in Millgram, ed. 2001. Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
ENOCH, D. Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What is Constitutive of Action. The Philosophical Review 115: 169-198, 2006.
ENOCH, D. Shmagency Revisited. In New Waves in Metaethics, ed. Michael Brady. Palgrave: MacMillan, 2011a.
ENOCH, D. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011b.
FERRERO, L. Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 4. Ed. Russ Shafer-Landau. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
FERRERO, L. Forthcoming. Inescapability Revisited. Manuscrito, 2018.
GEACH, P. Good and Evil. Analysis 17:32-42, 1956.
HORTY, J. Reasons as Defaults. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
HORST, D. (ms). In Defense of Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.
KATSAFANAS, P. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
KATSAFANAS, P. Constitutivism and Practical Reason. In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
KORNBLITH, H. Belief in the Face of Controversy. In Feldman, R. & Warfield, T. A. (eds.) Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.28-52.
KORSGAARD, C. M. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
KORSGAARD, C. M. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
LINDEMAN, K. Constitutivism without Normative Thresholds. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12(3):231-258, 2017.
MARKOVITS, J. Moral Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
MCDOWELL, J. Might There Be External Reasons? In J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds. World, Mind, and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
O'HAGAN, E. Shmagents, Realism and Constitutivism about Rational Norms. The Journal of Value Inquiry 48(1):17-31, 2014.
PAAKKUNAINEN, H. Normativity and Agency. In Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, ed. Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett. Routledge, 2017a.
PAAKKUNAINEN, H. Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action? Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 12:56-93, 2017b.
PAAKKUNAINEN, H. 2018. The “Just Too Different” Objection to Normative Naturalism. Philosophy Compass 13:e12473. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12473
RAZ, J, ed. Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
RAZ, J., ed. Agency, Reason, and the Good. In Raz, J. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999a.
RAZ, J., ed. The Truth in Particularism. In Raz, J. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999b.
ROSATI, C. Agency and the Open Question Argument. Ethics 113:490-527, 2003.
ROSATI, C. Agents and “Shmagents”: An Essay on Agency and Normativity. Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 11:182-213, 2016.
SCHROEDER, M. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
SETIYA, K. Reasons without Rationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
SETIYA, K. What Is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167:221-235, 2014.
SILVERSTEIN, M. The Shmagency Question. Philosophical Studies 172:1127-1142, 2015.
SMITH, M. Reasons With Rationalism After All. Analysis 69 No.3: 521-30, 2009.
SMITH, M. A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts. Law, Ethics, and Philosophy 1:9-30, 2013.
SMITH, M. The Magic of Constitutivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 52:187-200, 2015.
TIFFANY, E. Why Be an Agent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(2):223–33, 2012.
TUBERT, A. Korsgaard's Constitutive Arguments and the Principles of Practical Reason. Philosophical Quarterly 61: 343-62, 2011.
VELLEMAN, J. D. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
VELLEMAN, J. D. How We Get Along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
VOGLER, C. Reasonably Vicious. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
WALDEN, K. Laws of Nature, Laws of Freedom, and the Social Construction of Normativity. In Russ Shafer-Landau, ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:37-79, 2012.
WAY, J. Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(2):1-20, 2017.
WEDGWOOD, R. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
WILLIAMS, B. Internal and External Reasons. In Williams, Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Descargas
