Palavras-chave
Filosofia
Limites
Como Citar
Resumo
It is widely presumed that there are limits, severe limits, to thought, and therewith to inquiry and philosophy, limits of a range of sorts. But, to the contrary ther are no limitys to any of these items, thougth, inquiry and philosophy: no absolute limitys. Granted there are limitys, of many significant sorts, such as terrestrial limitys (to industrial growth) and physical limitys(to signal velocities and to mensurability). But these are conditional limitations, which do not inhibit ideal activity such as inquiry includes or systematization such as phylosopy, whuch likewise prove to be but conditional limitations or the like. Confirming these grand claims calls for much back-up activity, including: clarification of notions os limits, and distinction of prime and technical notions ythereof; demolition of a range of arguments to limits; developmente of positive arguments designed to show that there are no limitations; and more.
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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1996 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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