Palabras clave
Realismo Cientifico
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Resumen
Este artigo procura discutir o problema do realismo científico em sua relação com o ceticismo, examinando as doutrinas de Arthur Fine, NOA a atitude ontológica natural, e de Oswaldo Porchat, o neopirronismo, em especial a respeito da noção de verdade, e propõe ainda uma terceira abordagem ao problema, o ceticismo alético.
Citas
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
Derechos de autor 1996 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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