Palavras-chave
Dependente da prática
Realismo
Julian Cole
John Searle
Como Citar
Resumo
Even though it is obvious that mathematics involves social activities, this rather trivial fact is rarely considered as important for its subject matter, mostly due to its undesired ontological consequences. An attempted solution for this tension was developed by Julian Cole’s institutional account of mathematics, named Practice- Dependent Realism. In the present paper, Cole’s account is evaluated, and its lights and shadows assessed concerning the ontological problem that he seeks to solve. I argue that his institutional account, although failing in delivering a sufficient ontological account of mathematics, still opens an important linguistic route for explaining its practice.
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