Palabras clave
Ilusión de conocimiento
Prejuicios cognitivos
División del trabajo
Virtud intelectual
Cómo citar
Resumen
Una corriente reciente de la epistemología concede especial relevancia a la ignorancia en el marco de una teoría epistemológica. De hecho, algunos quieren otorgar un papel significativo a la ignorancia en la teorización epistemológica. En este artículo, argumentamos que un tipo particular de ignorancia, que implica el reconocimiento del hecho de que uno es ignorante, es fundamental para la adquisición de conocimiento dada la estructura epistémica de la sociedad. Está claro, sostenemos, que Sócrates se dio cuenta de la relevancia de lo que llamamos "ignorancia socrática" en la adquisición del conocimiento y era consciente de la división del trabajo epistémico y cognitivo que encontramos en nuestra sociedad. Explicaremos la forma en que entendemos esta ignorancia socrática, en contraposición a lo que llamaremos 'ignorancia contumaz' y el papel que esta ignorancia de tintes socráticos y rasgos de carácter afines puede desempeñar en la adquisición de conocimiento de los demás y con los demás.
Citas
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Derechos de autor 2023 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
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