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Este artículo plantea tres objeciones a la propuesta de Richard Moran acerca de la relación entre razones y responsabilidad. En primer lugar, mostraré que la relación entre razones y responsabilidad que presenta Moran es problemática, por dos razones: primero, las creencias alienadas del agente pueden ser parte del razonamiento; y segundo, las llamadas razones de estado no cumplen el Principio de Transparencia, pero no eximen de responsabilidad. En segundo lugar, argumentaré que la propuesta atribucionista de Moran postula una relación demasiado exigente entre estados mentales y razonamiento. Tercero, señalaré la dificultad de la propuesta de Moran para recoger l
Abstract:
This article presents three objections to Richard Moran's proposal concerning the relation between reasons and responsibility. First, I will show that the relation between reasons and responsibility suggested by Moran is problematic, for two reasons. On the one hand, alienated beliefs can play a role in the reasoning process. On the other hand, state-given reasons do not meet the Transparency Condition, but they do not exempt the agent either. Second, I will argue that the relation between attitudes and reasons that Moran postulates is too demanding. Third, I will point out that Moran's account cannot accommodate the intuition that both responsibility and authorship come in degrees.
Keywords: Responsibility, Normative reasons, Authorship, Richard Moran.
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