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Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
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Palavras-chave

I-desire. Desire-like imagining. Imagination. Fiction. Pretense.

Como Citar

GUO, Yuchen. Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 41, n. 2, p. 29–53, 2018. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653288. Acesso em: 20 abr. 2024.

Resumo

In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.
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Referências

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