Palavras-chave
Percepção de objeto
Representação de objeto
Atenção
Como Citar
Resumo
Os pensamentos demonstrativos se distinguem pelo fato de seus conteúdos serem determinados relacionalmente, via percepção, ao invés de descritivamente. Portanto, uma tarefa fundamental de uma teoria do pensamento demonstrativo é elucidar como os fatos sobre a percepção visual podem explicar como esses pensamentos vêm a ter os conteúdos que possuem. O objetivo deste artigo é investigar como a psicologia cognitiva pode nos ajudar a resolver essa questão metassemântica, por meio de modelos empíricos de processamento visual. Embora exista uma disputa entre os modelos atencionais e não-atencionais quanto ao melhor mecanismo metassemântico para pensamentos demonstrativos, neste artigo argumentarei a favor de um modelo híbrido, que combine os dois tipos de processos. Nesta imagem, os mecanismos de atenção e não atenção não são mutuamente exclusivos, e cada um desempenha um papel específico na determinação do conteúdo singular dos pensamentos demonstrativos.
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