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Qual o papel da Presidência e dos Ministérios na produção legislativa do Poder Executivo? Com base em uma abordagem transacional sobre a relação entre o Presidente e os ministros, busca-se, a partir da identificação da autoria das iniciativas legislativas do Executivo, elencar os fatores que influenciam o Presidente a delegar decisões legislativas para os ministérios ou centralizar as decisões na Presidência. As hipóteses, testadas através de um modelo logístico para eventos raros, são que o aumento da distância ideológica, do número de ministros envolvidos na decisão e da institucionalização da Presidência aumenta a chance de centralização, enquanto o aumento na força legislativa dos partidos dos ministros envolvidos diminui a chance de centralização. Os resultados indicam que tais fatores importam para entender o processo de formulação legislativa dentro do Executivo e a escolha que o Presidente faz.
Abstract:
What is the role of the presidency and ministries in the legislative production of the Executive Branch? From a transactional approach to the relationship between the president and ministers we seek, through the identification of the authorship of the legislative initiatives of the Executive, evaluate the factors that influence the president to delegate legislative decisions to the ministries or centralize decisions in the presidency. The hypotheses tested using a logistic model for rare events is that the increase in ideological distance, the number of ministers involved in the decision and the institutionalization of the presidency increases the probability of centralization, while the increase in the legislative strength of the parties of the ministers involved decreases the probability of centralization. The results indicate that these factors matter to understand the process of legislative formulation within the Executive and the choice that the president does.
Keywords: presidents; ministers; coalition government; legislative production
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