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Qual é o efeito do financiamento de campanha sobre o comportamento do parlamentar? Este artigo analisa a votação dos deputados federais brasileiros (1999-2007) em relação aos projetos de interesse da Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI). Metodologicamente, o artigo combina estatística descritiva e multivariada para testar a hipótese de que quanto maior é o financiamento de campanha pela indústria, maior é a cooperação do parlamentar com os interesses desse setor. Foram utilizados análise de cluster e modelos de regressão logístico e de Poisson para estimar o efeito do financiamento de campanha sobre a cooperação do parlamentar com o setor da indústria. Os resultados confirmam parcialmente a hipótese. Não foi encontrada relação entre o financiamento da indústria e a cooperação dos parlamentares, mas confirma-se que a proporção de recursos corporativos influencia positivamente a cooperação dos parlamentares brasileiros com os interesses da CNI, controlando por diferentes variáveis. Esses resultados se alinham à literatura internacional sobre o tema, que encontra uma relação positiva entre contribuições de campanha e comportamento congressual.
Abstract:
What is the effect of campaign financing on the behavior of congressman? This article analyzes the vote of Brazilian federal deputies (1999-2007) in relation to the projects of interest to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI). Methodologically, the article combines descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis to test the hypothesis that, the higher the campaign financing by industry, greater parliamentary cooperation with the interests of this sector. We use cluster analysis, logistic regression models and Poisson to estimate the effect of campaign financing on cooperation. The results confirm the hypothesis partially. Relationship between industry funding and cooperation of parliamentarians was not found, but it is confirmed that the proportion of corporate resources influences positively the cooperation of Brazilian parliamentarians with the interests of the CNI, controlling by different variables. These results align to the international literature about the subject that finds a positive relationship between campaign contributions and Congressional behavior.
Keywords: campaign finance; legislative behavior; industry; National Confederation of Industry
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