Palavras-chave
Como Citar
Resumo
Vale a pena ser um bom prefeito? Os eleitores premiam ou punem os atuais ocupantes da prefeitura com base na gestão fiscal? De um lado, pesquisadores da escola de Michigan argumentam que eleitores são desinformados e com pouco conhecimento político. Assim, os cidadãos tomam decisões eleitorais míopes. Por outro lado, a literatura de accountability eleitoral, sobretudo do voto retrospectivo, defende que, embora eleitores possuam informações incompletas, suas decisões eleitorais são competentes, logo, premiam ou punem políticos/partidos de acordo com o seu desempenho. No sentido de testar essas hipóteses no caso brasileiro, o artigo mensura os efeitos do desempenho fiscal das prefeituras, caracterizado pelo Índice Firjan de Gestão Fiscal, na probabilidade de reeleição em 2008. Os resultados dos modelos multivariados confirmam o voto retrospectivo, na medida em que se observam efeitos expressivos da administração orçamentária e financeira sobre as chances de reeleição dos prefeitos.
Abstract:
Is it worth to be a good mayor? Do voters reward or punish incumbent based on their fiscal outputs? On the one hand, researchers of the school of Michigan claim that voters are uninformed and lack political knowledge. Hence they frequently make myopic electoral decisions. On the other hand, the literature of electoral accountability, specially the retrospective voting, argues that even though voters are not completely informed, they make competent electoral decisions. Ultimately, citizens vote rewarding or punishing the incumbents based on their administration results. In order to test citizen competence and political accountability assumptions, this article examines if voters reward better fiscal policy performance by reelecting incumbent mayors, using indexes that reflect important aspects concerning fiscal outputs. The multivariate model results confirm the retrospective voting since it is observed significant effects of budgetary and financial management on the chances of the reelection of the mayors
Keywords: electoral behavior; retrospective voting; fiscal management; Brazil
Referências
AFONSO, R.; ARAÚJO, E. A capacidade de gastos dos municípios brasileiros: arrecadação própria e receita disponível. In: NEVES, G., et al. (orgs.). Os municípios e as eleições de 2000. São Paulo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 35-56, 2000.
ANSOLABEHERE, S.; GERBER, A.; SNYDER, J. “Equal votes, equal money: court-ordered redistricting and public expenditures in the American states”. American Political Science Review, nº 96, p. 767-77, 2002.
BARTELS, L. M. “The irrational electorate”. Wilson Quarterly, nº 32, p. 44-50, 2008.
CAMPBELL, A., et al. The American voter. New York: Wiley, 1960.
CAPLAN, B. The myth of the rational voter: why democracies choose bad policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
CASTRO, M. “Determinantes do comportamento eleitoral: a centralidade da sofisticação política”. Tese de Doutorado em Ciência Política. Iuperj, Rio de Janeiro, 1994.
CONVERSE, P. E. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In: APTER, D. E. Ideology and discontent. New York: Free Press, p. 206-61, 1964.
DELLI CARPINI, M.; KEETER, S. What Americans know about politics and why it matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.
DOWNS, A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper, 1957.
FEARON, J. D. Electoral accountability and the control of politicians: selecting types versus sanctioning poor performance. In: PRZEWORSKI, A.; STOKES, S. C.; MANIN, B. (eds.). Democracy, accountability and representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 55-97, 1999.
FEREJOHN, J. Accountability and authority. In: PRZEWORSKI, A.; STOKES, S.; MANIN, B. (eds.). Democracy, accountability, and representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
FIGUEIREDO, M. A decisão do voto: democracia e racionalidade. São Paulo: Editora Sumaré/Anpocs, 1991.
FIORINA, M. Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.
FIRJAN. Anexo metodológico. Disponível em <http://www.firjan.org.br/IFGF/download/anexo_metodologico_IFGF.pdf>,2012. Acesso em: 8 ago. 2013.
GOMEZ, B.; WILSON, J. “Cognitive heterogeneity and economic voting: a comparative analysis of four democratic electorates”. American Journal of Political Science, nº 50, p. 127-45, 2006.
GOLOSOV, G. “The effective number of parties: a new approach”. Party Politics, vol. 16, no 2, p. 171-192, 2010.
GOREN, P. On voter competence. Cambridge: Oxford University, 2013.
GUJARATI, D. Basic econometrics. New York: McGraw Hill, 2003.
HEALY, A.; MALHOTRA, N. “Myopic voters and natural disaster policy”. American Political Science Review, vol. 103, nº 3, p. 387-406, 2009.
KEY JR., V. O. The responsible electorate: rationality in presidential voting, 1936-1960. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966.
KUKLINSKI, J. H., et al. “Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship”. Journal of Politics, nº 62, p. 790-816, 2000.
LEWIS-BECK, M., et al. The American voter revisited. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.
LIPSET, S. M.; ROKKAN, S. Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. Free Press, 1967.
LUPIA, A. “Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: information and voting behavior in California insurance reform elections”. American Political Science Review, nº 88, p. 63-76, 1994.
LUPIA, A.; MCCUBBINS, M. The democratic dilemma: can citizens learn what they need to know?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
MAINWARING, S. Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization: the case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
MANIN, B.; PRZEWORSKI, A.; STOKES, S. Introduction. In: PRZEWORSKI, A.; STOKES, S.; MANIN, B. (eds.). Democracy, accountability, and representation. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
MARAVALL, J. M. Accountability and manipulation. In: PRZEWORSKI, A.; STOKES, S.; MANIN, B. (eds.). Democracy, accountability, and representation. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 154-196, 1999.
MARAVALL, J. M. Accountability and the survival of governments. In: STOKES, S.; BOIX, C. (eds.). The Oxford handbook of comparative politics. Oxford University, 2009.
MOISÉS, J. A. (org.). Democracia e confiança: por que os cidadãos desconfiam das instituições públicas?. São Paulo: Edusp, 2013.
PELTZMAN, S. “How efficient is the voting market?”. Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 33, nº 1, p. 27-64, 1990.
PETERS, G. The politics of taxation: a comparative perspective. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991.
POPKIN, S. I. The reasoning voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
POWELL, G. Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven/Londres: Yale University Press, 2000.
RUDOLPH, T. J. “Who’s responsible for the economy? The formation and consequences of responsibility attributions”. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, p. 698-713, 2003.
SNIDERMAN, P. M.; BRODY, R. A.; TETLOCK, P. Reasoning and choice: explorations in political psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
SOUZA, C. “Governos locais e gestão de políticas sociais universais”. São Paulo em Perspectiva. São Paulo, vol. 18, nº 2, p. 27-41, 2004.
STEIN, R. M. “Economic voting for governor and U.S.senator: the electoral consequences of federalism”. Journal of Politics, vol. 52, p. 29-53, 1990.
WOOLDRIDGE, J. M. Introdução à econometria: uma abordagem moderna. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Thompson, 2006.
A Opinião Pública utiliza a licença do Creative Commons (CC), preservando assim, a integridade dos artigos em ambiente de acesso aberto.
Downloads
