Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks

Autores

  • Dirk Greimann University of Santa Maria

Palavras-chave:

Chateaubriand. Truth. Reference. Identification. Sentences. Definite descriptions

Resumo

Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain.

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Biografia do Autor

Dirk Greimann, University of Santa Maria

Department of Philosophy Federal University of Santa Maria SANTA MARIA, RS BRAZIL

Referências

CHATEAUBRIAND, O. Logical Forms. Part I. Truth and Description.

Campinas: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência/ UNICAMP, 2001. (Coleção CLE, 34) DONNELLAN, K. “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, Philosophical Review 75, pp. 281-304, 1966.

DUMMETT, M. Frege. Philosophy of Language, London: Harper and Row, 1973.

———. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

GREIMANN, D. “The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege’s Scientific Language”, Erkenntnis 52, pp. 213-238, 2000.

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Publicado

2016-03-16

Como Citar

Greimann, D. (2016). Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 27(1), 79–85. Recuperado de https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644163

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