Keywords
Chateaubriand. Truth. Reference. Identification. Sentences. Definite descriptions
How to Cite
GREIMANN, Dirk. Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks. Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy, Campinas, SP, v. 27, n. 1, p. 79–85, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644163. Acesso em: 4 jul. 2024.
Abstract
Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain.References
CHATEAUBRIAND, O. Logical Forms. Part I. Truth and Description.
Campinas: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência/ UNICAMP, 2001. (Coleção CLE, 34) DONNELLAN, K. “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, Philosophical Review 75, pp. 281-304, 1966.
DUMMETT, M. Frege. Philosophy of Language, London: Harper and Row, 1973.
———. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
GREIMANN, D. “The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege’s Scientific Language”, Erkenntnis 52, pp. 213-238, 2000.
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