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Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks
v. 27 n. 1 (2004), Artigos
v. 27 n. 1 (2004)

Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks

Artigos
Publicado 2016-03-16
Dirk Greimann
University of Santa Maria
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Palavras-chave

Chateaubriand. Truth. Reference. Identification. Sentences. Definite descriptions

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GREIMANN, Dirk. Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification. Some critical remarks. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 27, n. 1, p. 79–85, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644163. Acesso em: 26 abr. 2024.
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Resumo

Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain.
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Referências

CHATEAUBRIAND, O. Logical Forms. Part I. Truth and Description.

Campinas: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência/ UNICAMP, 2001. (Coleção CLE, 34) DONNELLAN, K. “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, Philosophical Review 75, pp. 281-304, 1966.

DUMMETT, M. Frege. Philosophy of Language, London: Harper and Row, 1973.

———. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

GREIMANN, D. “The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege’s Scientific Language”, Erkenntnis 52, pp. 213-238, 2000.

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