Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions

Autores

  • Gustavo Ortiz Millán Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Palavras-chave:

The cognitive nature of emotions

Resumo

Martha Nussbaum tells us that emotions are cognitive value judgments. She claims that her theory, the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, can handle traditional objections to cognitive theories of emotions. However, in this paper I hold that she improperly takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term “cognition”: she faces the problems that arise when the term “cognition” is used in a very narrow sense (which claims that emotions are beliefs), resorting to a very wide sense under which any mental process is cognitive. I argue that this move does not solve the problems of the traditional cognitive theories of emotions. In order to show this, I distinguish four senses in which the term “cognitive” is used in theories of emotions, I analyze the ways Nussbaum uses them and why this move does not solve the traditional objections.

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Biografia do Autor

Gustavo Ortiz Millán, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 

Referências

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Publicado

2016-10-27

Como Citar

MILLÁN, G. O. Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 39, n. 2, p. 10–13, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647292. Acesso em: 30 set. 2022.

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