Estructuras fundamentales concretas

Autores

Palavras-chave:

Realismo estructural óntico, Estructuras, Relaciones, Cúmulos de tropos, Sustratos.

Resumo

Varios problemas en la filosofía de la física han llevado al ‘realismo estructural óntico’, esto es, la suposición de que en el nivel físico fundamental no hay ‘objetos’, sino ‘estructuras’. Hay varios requerimientos que una ‘estructura’ debe satisfacer para el ‘realismo estructural óntico’. Las estructuras deben ser entidades concretas, debe haber algo que cumpla las
funciones de ‘nodo’, y las relaciones no deben depender de los objetos que están siendo relacionados. La mayoría de las ontologías tradicionales, tanto de sustratos y propiedades, como de cúmulos de propiedades, parecen ser inadecuadas para satisfacer tales requerimientos. Se argumenta aquí que hay varias formas en que tales requerimientos podrían ser solventados: por relaciones nodales, por ‘hechos nodales’ primitivos y por
dependencias simétricas entre objetos y relaciones.

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Biografia do Autor

José Tomás Alvarado Marambio, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Instituto de Filosofía - Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

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Publicado

2019-09-03

Como Citar

MARAMBIO, J. T. A. Estructuras fundamentales concretas. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 42, n. 1, p. 121–168, 2019. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8656460. Acesso em: 9 dez. 2022.

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