Book review

VAN INWAGEN, Peter. Thinking about Free Will. (Cambridge University Press, 2017, 232 pages.)

Autores

Palavras-chave:

The problem of free will, Peter van Inwagen, Moral responsibility, Determinism.

Resumo

In this review, I discuss some aspects of van Inwagen’s insights with respect to the notions of free will and determinism. My main focus is on the author’s formulation of the free will problem.

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Biografia do Autor

Pedro Merlussi, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Pesquisador de pós-doutorado pelo Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência da Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

Referências

BEEBEE, H. The nongoverning conception of laws of nature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 571–594, 2000.

BEEBEE, H. Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2): 258–277, 2003.

BENNETT, J. Counterfactuals and temporal direction. The Philosophical Review 93 (1): 57-91, 1984.

CARTWRIGHT, N. & MERLUSSI, P. Are laws of nature consistent with contingency?. In: Laws of nature, eds. W. Ott and, 2018. L. PATTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

DORR, C. Against counterfactual miracles'. The Philosophical Review, 125 (2): 241–286, 2016.

GOODMAN, J. Knowledge, counterfactuals and determinism. Philosophical Studies 172 (9): 2275-2278, 2015.

MCKAY, T. J. and JOHNSON, D. A reconsideration of an argument against compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 113–122, 1996.

LEWIS, D. Are we free to break the laws?. Theoria 47: 113-21, 1981.

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Publicado

2019-09-03

Como Citar

MERLUSSI, P. Book review: VAN INWAGEN, Peter. Thinking about Free Will. (Cambridge University Press, 2017, 232 pages.). Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 42, n. 1, p. 211–218, 2019. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8656534. Acesso em: 29 nov. 2022.

Edição

Seção

Book Review