From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism

Resumo

Do incompatibilist arguments, like some fatalist arguments, rest on modal fallacies? If Westphal (2012) is right, then one popular argument for incompatibilism van Inwagen’s “First Formal Argument” - does rest on a modal fallacy. Similarly, Warfield (2000) claims that the standard modal formulation of the master argument for incompatibilismisamodalfallacy. Here, Irefutebothclaims. Contra Westphal, I show that the mistake in van Inwagen’s "First Formal Argument" is no modal fallacy. After that, I argue that Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy can be easily avoided by using a plausible principle concerning actuality. Then, I show that this allows one to put forward a fairly simple argument for fatalism (the thesis that we aren’t able to do otherwise from what we actually do).

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Biografia do Autor

Pedro Merlussi, State University of Campinas

PhD in philosophy from Durham University. Postdoctoral at the Center for Logic, Epistemology and History of Science, State University of Campinas.

Referências

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Publicado
2019-10-11
Como Citar
Merlussi, P. (2019). From modal fallacies to a new argument for fatalism. Manuscrito, 42(3), 86-107. Recuperado de https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657077
Seção
Artigos