Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa in its context (posterior analytics I.33)



Aristotle, Explanation, Demonstration, Epistemology, Essencialism


Aristotle contrasts episteme and doxa through the key notions of universal and necessary. These notions have played a central role in Aristotle’s characterization of scientific knowledge in the previous chapters of APo. They are not spelled out in APo I.33, but work as a sort of reminder that packs an adequate characterization of scientific knowledge and thereby gives a highly specified context for Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa. I will try to show that this context introduces a contrast in terms of explanatory claims: on the one hand, episteme covers those claims which capture explanatory connections that are universal and necessary and thereby deliver scientific understanding; on the other hand, doxa covers the explanatory attempts that fail at doing so.


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Biografia do Autor

Lucas Angioni, University of Campinas

He is currently a professor at the State University of Campinas, in the area of ​​History of Ancient Philosophy.


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Como Citar

ANGIONI, L. Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa in its context (posterior analytics I.33). Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 42, n. 4, p. 157–210, 2019. Disponível em: Acesso em: 7 fev. 2023.