Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa in its context (posterior analytics I.33)

Autores

Palavras-chave:

Aristotle, Explanation, Demonstration, Epistemology, Essencialism

Resumo

Aristotle contrasts episteme and doxa through the key notions of universal and necessary. These notions have played a central role in Aristotle’s characterization of scientific knowledge in the previous chapters of APo. They are not spelled out in APo I.33, but work as a sort of reminder that packs an adequate characterization of scientific knowledge and thereby gives a highly specified context for Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa. I will try to show that this context introduces a contrast in terms of explanatory claims: on the one hand, episteme covers those claims which capture explanatory connections that are universal and necessary and thereby deliver scientific understanding; on the other hand, doxa covers the explanatory attempts that fail at doing so.

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Biografia do Autor

Lucas Angioni, University of Campinas

He is currently a professor at the State University of Campinas, in the area of ​​History of Ancient Philosophy.

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2019-12-03

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ANGIONI, L. Aristotle’s contrast between episteme and doxa in its context (posterior analytics I.33). Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 42, n. 4, p. 157–210, 2019. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657756. Acesso em: 7 fev. 2023.

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