Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to valente

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Palavras-chave:

Demonstrativos, Transparência, Contente

Resumo

Matheus Valente presents a number of examples designed to show that my theory of reference fixing for demonstratives violates the desideratum that demonstrative thoughts should be transparent to speakers. In this note I argue that the alleged desideratum is not really such and defend my theory against other criticisms made by Valente.

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Biografia do Autor

Mario Gómez-Torrente, Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México

Instituto de Pesquisas Filosóficas da Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México (UNAM).

Referências

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University

Press, Oxford.

Siegel, S. (2002), “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2, no. 1, Available at: https:www.philosophersimprint.org/002001.

Valente, M. (2020), “Bifurcations on the Road: Conflicting Intentions and Demonstrative Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.

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Publicado

2021-02-15

Como Citar

GÓMEZ-TORRENTE, M. Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to valente. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 130–141, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664466. Acesso em: 28 set. 2022.

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