Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to valente
Palavras-chave:Demonstrativos, Transparência, Contente
Matheus Valente presents a number of examples designed to show that my theory of reference fixing for demonstratives violates the desideratum that demonstrative thoughts should be transparent to speakers. In this note I argue that the alleged desideratum is not really such and defend my theory against other criticisms made by Valente.
Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University
Siegel, S. (2002), “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2, no. 1, Available at: https:www.philosophersimprint.org/002001.
Valente, M. (2020), “Bifurcations on the Road: Conflicting Intentions and Demonstrative Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.
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