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Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to valente
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Keywords

Demonstratives
Transparency
Content

How to Cite

GÓMEZ-TORRENTE, Mario. Demonstrative contents and opaque thoughts. Reply to valente. Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 130–141, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664466. Acesso em: 16 aug. 2024.

Abstract

Matheus Valente presents a number of examples designed to show that my theory of reference fixing for demonstratives violates the desideratum that demonstrative thoughts should be transparent to speakers. In this note I argue that the alleged desideratum is not really such and defend my theory against other criticisms made by Valente.

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References

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University

Press, Oxford.

Siegel, S. (2002), “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2, no. 1, Available at: https:www.philosophersimprint.org/002001.

Valente, M. (2020), “Bifurcations on the Road: Conflicting Intentions and Demonstrative Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia

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