Abstract
Matheus Valente presents a number of examples designed to show that my theory of reference fixing for demonstratives violates the desideratum that demonstrative thoughts should be transparent to speakers. In this note I argue that the alleged desideratum is not really such and defend my theory against other criticisms made by Valente.
References
Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Siegel, S. (2002), “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2, no. 1, Available at: https:www.philosophersimprint.org/002001.
Valente, M. (2020), “Bifurcations on the Road: Conflicting Intentions and Demonstrative Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.
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