Natural kinds and our semantic intuitions along the road



Termos de tipo natural, Propriedades científicas, Arbitrariedade, Perfis de determinação, Contexto


This is a comment on Gómez-Torrente’s approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms. Here I will focus on his concerns related to the arbitrariness argument and his attempt to formulate a reply to it that maintains most (if not all) of the “Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy” when it comes to the reference-fixing of such terms. Gómez-Torrente concludes that ordinary kind terms have distinct referents from scientific terms. I will challenge one of the premises that he employs in reaching this conclusion: namely, that the difference in determinacy profiles between ordinary natural kinds and scientific kinds is enough to assume that the terms referring to them do not share their referents. I also suggest that some kind of contextual interpretation of natural kind terms might provide a nice explanation of those determinacy variations.


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Biografia do Autor

Thainá Coltro Demartini, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Mestrado em andamento em filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas.


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Como Citar

DEMARTINI, T. C. . Natural kinds and our semantic intuitions along the road. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 199–214, 2021. Disponível em: Acesso em: 1 out. 2022.