Palavras-chave
Ilusão de conhecimento
Preconceito cognitivo
Divisão do trabalho
Virtude intelectual
Como Citar
Resumo
Uma corrente recente da epistemologia dá relevância especial à ignorância dentro da estrutura de uma teoria epistemológica. De fato, alguns querem dar um papel significativo à ignorância na teorização epistemológica. Neste artigo, argumentamos que um tipo específico de ignorância, que envolve o reconhecimento do fato de que se é ignorante, é fundamental para a aquisição de conhecimento, dada a estrutura epistêmica da sociedade. É claro, afirmamos, que Sócrates percebeu a relevância do que chamamos de "ignorância socrática" na aquisição de conhecimento e estava ciente da divisão do trabalho epistêmico e cognitivo que encontramos em nossa sociedade. Explicaremos a maneira como entendemos essa ignorância socrática, em oposição ao que chamaremos de "ignorância teimosa", e o papel que essa ignorância de conotações socráticas e traços de caráter relacionados pode desempenhar na aquisição de conhecimento de outras pessoas e com outras pessoas.
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