Banner Portal
Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a murdochian constitutivist account
v. 41 n. 4 (2018), Artigos
v. 41 n. 4 (2018)

Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a murdochian constitutivist account

Artigos
Publicado 2018-12-04
Evgenia Mylonaki
University of Athens
PDF

Palavras-chave

Action. Instrumental. Normativity. Constitutivism. G. E. M. Anscombe. Iris Murdoch. Michael Thompson.

Como Citar

MYLONAKI, Evgenia. Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a murdochian constitutivist account. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 41, n. 4, p. 349–388, 2018. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654130. Acesso em: 17 jul. 2024.
ACM ACS APA ABNT Chicago Harvard IEEE MLA Turabian Vancouver

Baixar Citação

Endnote/Zotero/Mendeley (RIS) BibTeX

Resumo

In this paper I present a neo-Anscombean account of instrumental normativity and argue against it. I turn to the writings of Iris Murdoch in order to develop an alternative Anscombean account of instrumental normativity.
PDF

Referências

Aristotle. De Anima. Translated by D. W. Hamlyn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Aristotle. Eudemian Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939.

Anscombe, G. E. M. Intention, Second Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957.

Bedke, M. “The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End-Given Conditionals”. Ethics 119(4): 672–698, 2009.

Broome, J. “Normative Requirements”. Ratio 12: 398-419, 1999.

Broome, J. “Normative Practical Reasoning”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 75(1): 175–193, 2001.

Broome, J. “Practical Reasoning”, in J. L. Bermúdez and A. Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Broome, J. “Reasons”, in R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler and M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Broome, J. “Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?”. Philosophical Issues 15(1): 321–337, 2005.

Broome, J. “Wide or Narrow Scope?”. Mind 116 (462): 359-370, 2007. Brunero, J. “Are Intentions Reasons?”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88(4): 424–444, 2007.

Broome, J. “The Scope of Rational Requirements”. The Philosophical Quarterly 60(238): 28–49, 2010.

Broome, J. “Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope”. Philosophical Studies 157(1): 125–140, 2012.

Clark, P. “Velleman’s Autonomism”. Ethics 111(3): 580–593, 2001.

Comrie, B. Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Dancy, J. Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kolodny, N. “Why Be Rational?”. Mind 114(455): 509–563, 2005.

Kolodny, N. “How Does Coherence Matter?”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107(1): 229–263, 2007a.

Kolodny, N. “State or Process Requirements”. Mind 116 (462): 371–385, 2007b.

Kolodny, N. “The Myth of Practical Consistency”. European Journal of Philosophy 16(3): 366–402b, 2008a.

Kolodny, N. “Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?”. Ethics 118(3): 437–463, 2008b.

Korsgaard, C. M. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason”, in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Korsgaard, C. M. The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Kosman, A. The Activity of Being; An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Lindeman, K. (unpublished) Constitutivism without Thresholds.

Murdoch, I. The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.

McDowell, J. “Virtue and Reason”. The Monist 62(3): 331–350, 1979.

McDowell, J. “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology”. Ethics 4: 107, 1998.

Raz, R. J. “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality”. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1(1): 2–28, 2005.

Railton, P. “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action”, in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Rödl, S. Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Schroeder, M. “The Scope of Instrumental Reason”. Philosophical Perspectives 18(1): 337–364, 2004.

Schroeder, M. “Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons”. Noûs 41(1): 110–132, 2007.

Schroeder, M. “Means-End Coherence, Stringency and Subjective Reasons”. Philosophical Studies 143(2): 223–248, 2009.

Schroeder, M. “Ought, Agents and Actions”. The Philosophical Review 120(1): 1–41, 2011.

Setiya, K. “Is Efficiency a Vice?”. American Philosophical Quarterly 42(4): 333–339, 2005.

Setiya, K. “Cognitivism About Instrumental Reason”. Ethics 117(4): 649–673, 2007.

Thompson, M. Life and Action, Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Valaris, M. “Instrumental Rationality”. European Journal of Philosophy 22(3): 443–462, 2014.

Vogler, C. Reasonably Vicious. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Vogler, C. “The Instrumental Structure of Actions”. The Philosophical Quarterly 65(258): 64–83, 2015.

Wallace, R. J. “Normativity, Commitment and Instrumental Reason”. Philosophers’ Imprint 1(3): 1–26, 2001.

Way, J. “Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason”. Philosophical Studies 147(2): 213–233, 2010.

Way, J. “The Symmetry of Rational Requirements”. Philosophical Studies 155(2): 227–239, 2011.

Wiggins, D. Needs, Values, Truth. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.

Wiseman, R. Anscombe’s Intention. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.