Keywords
Filosofia
How to Cite
Abstract
It seems to be impossible to defend any dogmatic philosophy against skeptical arguments, since to any doctrine it is possible to oppose another, equally plausible and equally unprovable. This equipollence leads the skeptic to suspend judgement. While thus refraining from accepting any philosophical doctrine, he still philosophizes. It is argued in this paper that a constructive form of permanent investigative philosophy similar to skcepticism exists, which differs substantially from it in its aims.
References
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1993 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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