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Self-restraint and morality
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Keywords

Ethics
Self-restraint
Temptation

How to Cite

BENZIMAN, Yotam. Self-restraint and morality. Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 3, p. 55–71, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664308. Acesso em: 17 jul. 2024.

Abstract

The item was in the news. A public official said that he would hire a male rather than a female driver, because following the growing influence of the #MeToo movement, hiring a man would be safer. That way nobody would accuse him of harassment. The official’s declaration aroused justified public criticism. Being a public official, he must be committed to equality-in-hiring practices. But suppose that it were a private individual, who wanted to do his utmost to keep away from temptation. It might seem that there is nothing wrong with that: he is free to hire whomever he wishes, and his caution is justified: planning ahead and resisting temptation are marks of rationality and personhood, in Harry Frankfurt’s sense of the term. But why should one be so cautious to begin with? Challenging other philosophical analyses of temptation, I argue that temptations are hardly irresistible. We should all take responsibility for our actions and behavior. It is a moral duty to control ourselves and not let others pay the price for our shortcomings. This notion is both Kantian, as it emphasizes autonomy, and Aristotelian: it urges us to work on our virtues.

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References

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Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia

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