Similarity as an extension of symmetry and its application to superrationality

Carlos   Maximiliano Senci; Fernando Abel Tohmé

v. 44 n. 2 (2021), Artigos

v. 44 n. 2 (2021)

Similarity as an extension of symmetry and its application to superrationality

Artigos

Publicado 2021-09-29

Carlos Maximiliano Senci⁺⁻
Fernando Abel Tohmé⁺⁻

Carlos Maximiliano Senci

Universidade Nacional do Sul

http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9131-3843

Fernando Abel Tohmé

Universidade Nacional do Sul

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2988-4519

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Palavras-chave

Filosofia

Como Citar

MAXIMILIANO SENCI, Carlos; ABEL TOHMÉ, Fernando. Similarity as an extension of symmetry and its application to superrationality. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 44, n. 2, p. 128–157, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8667160. Acesso em: 18 abr. 2024.

Resumo

n this paper we present a concept of similarity in games, on which to ground alternative solution concepts, some of which differ from the classical notions in the field. In order to do this we impose a constraint on players’ beliefs that amounts to a variant of the well-known symmetry principle in classical bargaining theory. We show how this similarity relation helps to identify different Nash equilibria in games, and how these “similar Nash equilibria” can be extended to non-symmetric games. While the notion is normative, it is nonetheless inspired by phenomena in which similarities between players lead to outcomes detected in behavioral studies. We study the strategic properties of the concept of similarity and discuss its relationships with Hofstadter’ notion of superrationality.

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