Keywords
Semantic content
Context
Thought
Speaker's role
How to Cite
Abstract
Bozickovic’s The Indexical Point of View is a richly informative and solid philosophical work about the problem of cognitive significance involving indexical thoughts and expressions. Although I tend to agree with most of what is said in the book, here I will make some comments on two minor correlated points regarding Bozickovic’s Fregean account of indirect speech reports (or ISRs). After presenting some of the author's ideas about reports, I will claim that the tracking and updating involved in ISRs is of a complex kind that requires attention to the role played by speech reporters and their audiences. Following that, I will hold that a general theory of correct ISR strictly in Fregean terms (as Bozickovic’s) fails to account for that - at least directly.
References
BORG, E. “Explanatory roles for minimal contente”. Noûs, v. 53, n. 3, p. 513-539, 2019.
BOZICKOVIC, V. The Indexical Point of View: On Cognitive Significance and Cognitive Dynamics Routledge, 2020.
CAPPELEN, H.; LEPORE, E. “On an alleged connection between indirect speech and the theory of meaning”. Mind & Language, v. 12, n. 3‐4, p. 278-296, 1997.
CAPPELEN, H.; LEPORE, E. Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
CARSTON, R. ‘Truth-conditional content and conversational implicature”. The semantics/pragmatics distinction, p. 65-100, 2004.
CHAPMAN, S. Paul Grice: philosopher and linguist Springer, 2005.
FREGE, G. 1918/1977. Thoughts. In Geach, P. T. (ed.), Logical Investigations Oxford: Blackwell, 1977, pp. 1-30.
KAPLAN. D. “Demonstratives”. Em J. Among, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 481-563, 1989.
PERRY, J. "Frege on demonstratives." Philosophical Review 86, 47497; reprinted in Perry (1997) p. 325 (page numbers refer to this printing), 1977.
PERRY, J. The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other essays Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
PERRY, J. Reference and reflexivity Stanford: CSLI, 2001.
RECANATI, F. Literal Meaning Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004a.
RECANATI, F. ‘What is said’ and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Em C. Bianchi (ed.), pp. 45-64, 2004b.
RECANATI, F. Literalism and Contextualism: Some Varieties. Em Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning and Truth Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.171-96, 2005.
RECANATI, F. On truth-conditional Pragmatics Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010.
SAINSBURY, R. M. Departing from Frege: Essays in the Philosophy of Language Londres: Routlegde, 2002.
STRAWSON, Peter F. “On referring”. Mind, v. 59, n. 235, p. 320-344, 1950.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2022 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía
Downloads
