Keywords
Gappy logic
Glutty logic
Logical duality
Normative concepts
Normative error theory
How to Cite
Abstract
According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.
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