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Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a murdochian constitutivist account
Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018), Artigos
Vol. 41 No. 4 (2018)

Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a murdochian constitutivist account

Artigos
Published 2018-12-04
Evgenia Mylonaki
University of Athens
PDF (Português (Brasil))

Keywords

Action. Instrumental. Normativity. Constitutivism. G. E. M. Anscombe. Iris Murdoch. Michael Thompson.

How to Cite

MYLONAKI, Evgenia. Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: a murdochian constitutivist account. Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy, Campinas, SP, v. 41, n. 4, p. 349–388, 2018. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654130. Acesso em: 17 jul. 2024.
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Abstract

In this paper I present a neo-Anscombean account of instrumental normativity and argue against it. I turn to the writings of Iris Murdoch in order to develop an alternative Anscombean account of instrumental normativity.
PDF (Português (Brasil))

References

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