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Distinguishing knowledge from belief in understanding the logic of the poverty of stimulus argument
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GUIMARÃES, Maximiliano. Distinguishing knowledge from belief in understanding the logic of the poverty of stimulus argument. Cadernos de Estudos Linguísticos, Campinas, SP, v. 49, n. 2, p. 135–150, 2011. DOI: 10.20396/cel.v49i2.8637183. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/cel/article/view/8637183. Acesso em: 29 maio. 2024.

Resumo

Além da tese de que a gramática das línguas naturais inclui um nível transformacional, o que distingue o programa Chomskyano de investigação em Teoria da Gramática das outras abordagens é a tese de que o conhecimento gramatical internalizado por todo o ser humano é parcialmente inato (i.e.
parcialmente dado a priori por um sistema de viéses cognitivos tarefa-específicos da Gramática Universal), e não um subproduto de mecanismos auto-organizáveis de ‘inteligência geral’. Esta tese científica pode, em princípio, estar certa ou errada, e só pode ser questionada levando-se em conta a sua cobertura empírica e a lógica dos seus argumentos. No cerne desta questão está o Argumento de Pobreza de Estímulo (APS), cuja lógica tem sido alvo de inúmeros mal-entendidos por parte dos anti-inatistas, a exemplo de Geurts (2000), que deixa de reconhecer as distinções entre ‘conhecimento’ e ‘crença’, e entre cognição ‘consciente’ e ‘não-consciente’, as quais são cruciais para a compreensão da lógica do APS. O objetivo deste artigo é desfazer esse mal-entendido.
https://doi.org/10.20396/cel.v49i2.8637183
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