Scalar implicatures as implicatures of compatibility

Abstract

Scalar implicatures are traditionally defined as upper-bound interpretations of weak scalar terms, in which these terms assume the highest informative strength of their scales, denying more informative terms (e.g. "only some but not all") due to Grice's first submaxim of Quantity. I adhere to Noveck & Sperber (2007)'s hypothesis based on Relevance Theory, according to which the majority of cases considered scalar implicatures are just explicatures of conceptual narrowing (therefore, not implicatures nor scalar). However, in opposition to Noveck & Sperber (2007) I believe that not even implicated denials of stronger terms — which suitability to the context is under question — by weak terms should be considered scalar implicatures. I propose a model of derivation of such implicatures which is not supported by scalar relations established between concepts, but by the interlocutors' perception of compatibility between the concepts in comparison. I intend to demonstrate that processes of conceptual adjustment by explicature in conjunction with deductive rules of the modus ponens kind are sufficient for the extraction of implicatures of compatibility. Being so, the proposed model is able to explain a wider range of pragmatic phenomena than those classified as scalar implicatures resorting to principles that are common to the general interpretation of utterances and, in the case of deductive inferences, also to the interpretation of non-linguistic stimuli.